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EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY. By Thomas Nagel New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1991. Pp. viii, 186. Cloth, $17.95. 
Justice in the polity, Plato argued, mirrors justice in the individual: 
in both cases, justice consists of a suitable division of labor among 
different motivating forces. 1 In Equality and Partiality, Thomas 
Nagel2 ,recasts this argument in Kantian form. Nagel argues that 
political legitimacy - a state's rightful claim to exercise coercive 
power over its members - can arise only from proper integration, 
through institutional means, of the personal and impersonal stand-
points ,within each individual. 3 
Nagel analyzes the concept of political legitimacy in strongly indi-
vidualistic terms: "The pure ideal of political legitimacy is that the use 
of state power should be capable of being authorized by each citizen" 
(p. 8). This analysis, in effect, imposes a unanimity requirement on 
political legitimacy: a political system is legitimate if justifiable to 
every person who lives under it (p. 33). Importantly, the requirement 
attaches to the system - the "principles, institutions and procedures 
which determine how that power will be used" (p. 8) - rather than 
to particular, controversial decisions made within that controlling 
framework. 4 
Nagel formulates the unanimity requirement in familiar contractu-
alist terms: a legitimate political system rests on principles that "no 
one could reasonably reject, given the aim of finding principles which 
could be the basis of general agreement among persons similarly moti-
vated."5 According to Nagel, these principles do not merely represent 
a pragmatic bargain struck among self-interested agents pursuing their 
own interests6 but have independent normative and motivational 
1. PLATO'S REPUBLIC 99, 107 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974). 
2. Professor of Philosophy and Law, New York University. 
3. The underlying idea of the "dual standpoint" is as follows: (1) each person views the world 
from the personal standpoint of her own particular capacities, beliefs, desires, and commitments; 
(2) at the same time, each person has the capacity to survey the world from an impersonal 
standpoint that abstracts from the particular, contingent features of her personal perspective. P. 
10. 
4. P. 33. In contrast, Professor Wolff applies the requirement of authorization directly to 
particular decisions and, not surprisingly, concludes that a requirement of individual consent is 
incompatible with legitimate political authority. ROBERT P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCH• 
ISM 3-18 (1970). 
5. P. 36. Nagel explicitly draws on Professor Scanlon's contractualist account of moral 
wrongness: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by 
any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject 
as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement." Thomas M. Scanlon, Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 110 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Wittinms 
eds., 1982). 
6. Nagel's contractualism thus sharply differs from a Hobbesian, game-theoretic account of 
contractualist morality. See generally DAVID P. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986). 
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force. In particular, mere recognition of the fact that a system rests on 
principles no one could reasonably reject provides "reason to cooper-
ate voluntarily in the maintenance of such a system and to respect its 
results" quite apart from any coercive force the system itself brings to 
bear.7 
Whether Nagel's test of political legitimacy has any substantive 
content, of course, remains open to doubt. In the Anglo-American 
legal tradition, for lack of a better alternative, what the "reasonable" 
person believes is generally whatever twelve jurors on a particular day 
happen to say she believes. Such skepticism aside, Nagel himself de-
rives an abstract guideline as to what reasonable people can agree 
to from his characterization of the dual standpoint within each 
individual: 
Each of us has a primary attachment to his own personal interests, 
projects and commitments, but this is restrained by our occupation of 
the impersonal standpoint in two ways: first, by the recognition of the 
equal objective importance of what happens to everyone, and second, by 
the recognition of the special importance for each person of his own 
point of view . . . . [p. 38] 
This characterization informs Nagel's general criterion of reasonable 
nonrejectability: a legitimate political system "reconciles the two uni-
versal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no 
one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient 
weight or that the demands on him [to satisfy the reasonable interests 
of others] are excessive" (p. 38). 
Nagel gives few examples of actual institutional arrangements that 
appropriately strike such a balance. Rather, he articulates the general 
form of a solution. Nagel proposes a moral division of labor between 
individuals and social institutions: institutions realize the "impartial 
requirements of the impersonal standpoint" through a proper alloca-
tion of social resources, while simultaneously fostering sufficient "pri-
vate differentiation" as to enable individuals to pursue personal 
interests (pp. 53, 85). 
Social institutions, however, are not free-standing entities. Their 
existence depends on the support of the individuals they simultane-
ously shape. Hence, Nagel's proposal faces a crucial motivational 
problem, namely, whether individuals will both respect and provide 
continued support to the requisite social institutions. Interestingly, 
Nagel believes that capitalist society, which he generally praises as su-
perior to any alternative sociopolitical regime, thwarts such motiva-
tional development. Democratic politics encourage individuals to 
treat the political process, and the public institutions subject to its con-
7. P. 37. Nagel is thus committed to a noninstrumental conception of practical rationality. 
For Nagel's own earliest effort at developing such a conception, see generally THOMAS NAGEL, 
THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970). 
1244 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1242 
trol, as mere means of advancing private interests (p. 91). This result 
runs directly contrary to Nagel's conception of public institutions as 
"externalizing" the impartial concerns of agents who occupy both a 
personal and an impersonal standpoint. Meanwhile, capitalism, de-
spite its economic prowess, also leads to "large and inheritable in-
equalities" that Nagel considers intolerable from an impartial 
perspective. 8 
Rather than call for a wholesale political transformation, however, 
Nagel speculates on the changes in individual motivation that would 
support the widely redistributive institutions he envisions.9 Nagel ob-
serves that the lines drawn around personal and societal responsibility 
typically rest on a distinction between what individuals and social in-
stitutions do, and what they merely allow to happen (p. 99). For ex-
ample, we may feel a societal responsibility when the police arrest an 
innocent person, but not when they fail to arrest a dangerous person 
who subsequently commits a serious crime.10 In the latter case, re-
sponsibility is ascribed to the criminal alone. Although Nagel recog-
nizes the vitality of such a distinction in some aspects of individual 
and social conduct, he argues for the 
abandonment of the idea that there is a morally fundamental distinction, 
in regard to the socioeconomic framework which controls people's life 
prospects, between what the state does and what it merely allows .... 
[W]ith regard to income, wealth, and social position, health, education 
... it is essential that the society should be regarded by its members as 
responsible for how things are, if different feasible policies and institu-
tions would result in their being different. [p. 100] 
Nagel calls this the doctrine of negative responsibility. 
Negative responsibility implies that decisions "not" to interfere 
with distributive arrangements require the same degree of justification 
as decisions "to interfere": "Every arrangement has to be justified by 
comparison with every other real possibility." 11 Hence, popular ac-
8. P. 93. Nagel does not object to inequalities in income and wealth per se. The issue, rather, 
is what inequalities pass the test of "reasonable non-rejectability." This test, of course, pertains 
to the socioeconomic system that determines distributive outcomes rather than to particular dis-
tributions themselves. Large and inheritable inequalities are intolerable, on this analysis, when 
they result from a distributive scheme that systematically (1) gives short shrift to the reasonable 
demands of the least well-off, by (2) providing benefits to the better-off to which the better-off 
cannot reasonably lay claim. 
9. Nagel's arguments that a legitimate political system must overcome not only inequalities 
arising from differences in class, but also from differences in natural abilities, suggest their 
strongly redistributive nature. See pp. 106-16. 
10. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968) (municipality not liable 
in tort for police failure to protect one individual from another's attack); Davidson v. City of 
Westminster, 649 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1982). 
11. P. 100. In the context of constitutional litigation, questions about negative responsibility 
have surfaced most noticeably in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 
U.S. 189 (1989). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a due process claim against a social 
service agency based on negligent failure to protect a child from physical harm by his father. The 
Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause imposes on states only a negative duty not to de-
May 1993] Law & Equality 1245 
ceptance of this doctrine is the key to Nagelian egalitarianism, for it 
will induce the comparatively better off to see social policies, and not 
merely individual choices, implicated both in their own good eco-
nomic fortune and the lesser economic fortune of others. 
* * * 
The brevity of Equality and Partiality is both its virtue and its vice. 
Nagel develops a clear, simple argument that lays out the basic institu-
tional requirements and complementary political morality of Kantian 
liberalism. Nagel also deals pointedly, although much too succinctly, 
with two recurring criticisms of Kantian liberalism. At one extreme, 
hard-nosed consequentialists such as Professors Hare12 and Scheftler13 
argue, in effect, that a serious consideration of the impersonal stand-
point undermines the Kantian notion that individuals may stand on 
their own moral inviolability to resist pursuit of aggregate social bene-
fit. Nagel responds that Kantian impartiality instead demands 
pairwise, nonaggregative comparisons founded on "unanimity" or rea-
sonable nonrejectability (pp. 56, 68, 142). At the other extreme, Pro-
fessor Nozick14 has founded a libertarian regime of strong property 
rights, which block redistributive social policies, 15 partly on Kant's 
dictum to act so as to "treat humanity . . . never simply as a means, 
but always at the same time as an end."16 Nagel rejects such a regime 
as not "justified in terms of its effects in the lives of those living under 
it" (p. 140). Thus, although Nagel repudiates wholesale consequen-
tialism, he finds room within Kantian contractualism for some conse-
quentialist thought as an element of reasonable nonrejectability. 
Nagel unfortunately ignores criticism from two other corners. In 
evaluating alternative institutional arrangements, Nagel focuses al-
most exclusively on what may be called external goods - physical and 
institutional resources that may be given to, withheld from, and trans-
ferred between individual citizens. An alternative strand of political 
thought, however, connects the central questions of political theory to 
what may be called internal goods - aspects of human psychology 
that affect individuals' ability to realize their deepest purposes. 17 The 
prive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process, but no affirmative duty to provide 
services of any sort. 489 U.S. at 194-97. 
12. R.M. Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra 
note 5, at 23, 23-29. 
13. SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 84-107 (1982). 
14. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
15. Id. at 149-82. 
16. Id. at 32 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK TO THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton trans., 3d ed. 1958)). 
17. "Freedom ... involves my being able to recogni[z]e adequately my more important pur-
poses, and my being able to overcome or at least neutralize my motivational fetters, as well as my 
being free of any external obstacles." Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 
THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 175, 193 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979) [hereinafter Taylor, Negative Liberty]. 
Internal goods necessary for such freedom include self-discipline, self-esteem, self-understanding, 
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development of internal goods, furthermore, fundamentally implicates 
social relations, not merely institutional design; internal goods theo-
rists stress that issues of class, race, and gender influence self-develop-
ment as profoundly as the "external" resources an individual 
commands. 18 
Kantian programs also have raised longstanding concern about the 
viability of detaching the theory of the right from the theory of the 
good. 19 Communitarian critiques, for example, argue that we must 
first determine what sort of people we would like to be before proceed-
ing to the question of social institutional design.20 Hence, com-
munitarians reject Kantian deontology as incoherent, because it seeks 
to design social institutions without any serious consideration of the 
human motivations to which such institutions should respond.21 
Nagel provides a perfect case in point, for he tries to derive a political 
institutional framework entirely from considerations of fairness and 
reasonability, without inquiry into the values and self-understandings 
of the body politic's constitutive members. 
Nagel's obliviousness to such critiques is surprising, given their 
current prominence. Although Equality and Partiality astutely devel-
ops a particular strand of Kantian thought, it is ultimately unsatisfy-
ing. Nagel tells us how to approach political legitimacy if questions of 
abstract fairness predominate our political thought. Unfortunately, 
Nagel does not tell us why such questions should predominate in the 
face of contemporary anti-Kantian challenges. 
- Daniel A. Cohen 
self-control, and discriminating capacities of evaluation and judgment. Charles Taylor, What is 
Human Agency?, in 1 HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 15 (1985). 
18. To take one example, Professor MacKinnon argues that the fundamental social inequal-
ity involves the maldistribution across gender lines not of resources, but power. In her view, 
power is the fundamental determinant oflife prospects. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 3 (1987) ("social relation[s] between the sexes [are] so organized that 
men may dominate and women must submit"). 
19. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
20. See, e.g., Taylor, Negative Liberty, supra note 17, at 192-93. 
21. See generally SANDEL, supra note 19. 
